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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the year 2000, the German Real Estate Market has experienced
an increase in both housing prices and rents. However, these developments diﬀer across
Germany; agglomerations experience a sharp increase while housing prices and rents in
rural areas remain stable or even decrease slightly (BBSR, 2016). This uneven distri-
bution is caused by an emerging reurbanization pattern combined with a low supply of
living space in urban areas. The German Government has responded either with stricter
rent controls or more relaxed approval policies for new construction projects to increase
housing supply as policy tools to counteract this development.
This study contributes to the understanding of the reasons for a lack of housing supply in
agglomerations by investigating one of the factors that might have contributed to this is-
sue. Speciﬁcally, I examine whether construction approval policies change during election
periods. My results show a decrease of housing approvals during municipal elections in
West German municipalities. This is especially important since these adjustments might
delay life cycle related immigration outﬂows from agglomerations to suburbs. It is likely
that these potential homeowners then reside for a longer period in the agglomeration,
which would exacerbate the shortage of housing supply and hence might contribute to
the recent increase in real estate prices in urban areas.
The German housing market is an interesting study object, since German metropoli-
tan areas still have comparably low rent to income ratios compared to other European
metropolitan areas like Paris or London. Nevertheless, the German agglomerations seem
to follow the same path as their European counterparts and converge towards similar
real estate price levels. This gives an interesting opportunity to study the cause of rent
developments in agglomerations and the underlying reasons.
Historically, Germany has a low homeowner rate which has been explained by comparably
low subsidies, a strong social housing sector and a low rate of policy interventions. This
led to stable prices and relatively high housing quality in Germany. Hence, the incentive
to invest in private housing property was not as strong for individuals as in other coun-
tries (Voigtländer, 2009). Interestingly, the homeowner rate shows considerable spatial
variation, where especially the West German federal states experience higher homeowner
rates. Lerbs and Oberst (2014) investigated the spatial variation of homeowner rates
and ﬁnd that the relative price of renting over buying seems to drive this development.
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Regarding life satisfaction of homeowners in Germany, Zumbro (2014) found that they
are slightly happier on average. This ﬁnding is explained especially by the quality of
dwellings and is more pronounced within lower income groups.
For my analysis, I use a panel of 4,983 West German municipalities between 1,000 and
20,000 inhabitants for the years 2002 to 2010. These study objects are not large entities
like Frankfurt or Munich but small to medium sized municipalities located around these
agglomerations. Using the approved residence square meters (sqm) per 1,000 inhabitants
as dependent variable, I conduct ﬁxed eﬀects regression including municipality and year
ﬁxed eﬀects. The timing of local elections across federal states allows me to identify the
eﬀect of elections on housing approvals. Evaluated at the mean, my results suggest an
11.4 % decrease of approved housing sqm during election times and a catch up eﬀect of
similar magnitude in the years after the election. These results remain economically and
statistically signiﬁcant throughout diﬀerent robustness checks.
Furthermore, I investigate whether the share of homeowners in a municipality explains
this disruption during election times. The negative eﬀect on housing approval during
elections seems to be strongest for municipalities above the 90th percentile share of
homeowners. Furthermore, this eﬀect only occurs in single and double family houses.
This can be interpreted as suggestive evidence that this eﬀect is caused by homevoters
(Fischel, 2001), residential homeowners with a strong preference for the status quo in
their neighborhood.
My study contributes to two strands of literature. First, it adds an additional policy di-
mension to the literature about political business cycles. Initially proposed by Nordhaus
(1975), his theory suggests that politicians have an incentive to alter their ﬁscal policies
during election times in order to increase their re-election probabilities. Usually, this lit-
erature is mostly concerned with governmental budgeting and spending during election
times but my research shows that other parameters are also in the interest of politicians.
This theory has been applied successfully to diﬀerent political levels (e.g. national, state,
county and municipal elections) and diﬀerent countries((Alesina, Roubini, and Cohem,
1997; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Golden and Poterba, 1980;
Klomp and De Haan, 2013; Schuknecht, 1999)).1
The literature also shows strong eﬀects on governmental budgeting in Germany. However,
1For a literature overview of the relationship between election cycles and government spending
see Foremny, Freier, Moessinger, and Yeter (2014).
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it is important to distinguish which administrative level is subject to research in Germany,
since governmental layers have diﬀerent discretionary leeways and are aﬀected by diﬀerent
kinds of elections. In Germany, elections take place on the federal level for the German
Parliament, on the state level for the parliaments of the Länder and on the municipality
level for the local governments.
Starting at the state level, Mechtel and Potrafke (2013) show that job creation schemes
are more pronounced during election periods. Englmaier and Stowasser (2014) look at
the allocation of loans by state owned banks during county elections and ﬁnd an increase
in loans during election times. Schneider (2009) analyses German NUTS1 regions and
discusses diﬀerent channels of manipulating the budgetary business cycle. Using a panel
of West German cities, Furdas, Homolkova, and Kis-Katos (2015) examine spending pat-
terns of West German cities during election times and ﬁnd some evidence for adjustment
of spending in diﬀerent categories. Turning to the municipal level, Foremny and Riedel
(2014) show that elections aﬀect the tax setting pattern of municipalities regarding the
business tax. Foremny, Freier, Moessinger, and Yeter (2014) examine spending patterns
on a local level, where they distinguish the election eﬀect of the legislative and the execu-
tive. To the best of my knowledge, there is no literature that shows whether the election
cycle directly aﬀects housing policies. Furthermore, it is also the ﬁrst study for Germany
that considers a local policy parameter that is not related to budgeting.
Second, my results also contribute to the ongoing discussion on how political alignment,
council composition and the election system aﬀect local housing policies. For Spain,
Sole-Olle and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) show that mayors with a larger majority tend
to declare more land for development in a municipality independently of the political
aﬃliation. In addition, Sole-Olle and Viladecans-Marsal (2013) show that left wing
governments in Spain have a tendency to convert less rural land into areas open for
development. Garmann (2014) shows that mayors elected by the municipal council assign
more land open for development than mayors elected directly by the constituency. The
direct eﬀect of local elections on housing policies has not yet been examined.
In assessing electoral eﬀects, the question arises naturally which voters are most sensible
to urban policies. The literature identiﬁes the so-called homevoter. First introduced by
Brueckner and Lai (1996) in a classic monocentric city model, they model the homevoter
as landlord and tenant simultaneously. According to Fischel (2001) the homevoter pools
his savings in his house which then serves as his only asset. Hence, homevoters approve
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policies that increase the value of their house and, of course, try to avoid policy measures
that decrease housing prices, which might occur via the supply side or by negative side
eﬀects of urbanization like pollution and crime. Therefore, homevoters usually disapprove
of policies that increase housing supply and hence decrease the value of their asset2. The
occurrence of increasing homeownership and resistance to urban growth is also described
in Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2014).
So what should be the expected eﬀect of the presence of homevoters during election
times? Since homevoters will aim to preserve the value of their houses, all municipal
projects that foster urbanization will be opposed. Local politicians should be aware of
this occurrence and if homevoters are crucial for reelection it is likely that the homevoters'
calculus is taken into account by local politicians during local election times. This should
hence be reﬂected in lower housing approval rates during election periods. Whether this
result occurs in the German case is worth exploring since the homeowner rate is lower in
Germany than in the US and other European countries.
For the US, the literature ﬁnds general support for the homevoter hypothesis (Brun-
ner, Sonstelie, and Thayer, 2001; Brunner and Sonstelie, 2003; Hilber and Mayer, 2009;
Dehring, Depken, and Ward, 2008; Gerber, 1999; Gerber and Phillips, 2004). This eﬀect
is usually identiﬁed via public construction projects such as football stadiums or local
school voucher initiatives.
Regarding the German context, the literature discusses diﬀerent voting patterns between
homevoters and leasevoters (citizens that rent instead of own an apartment). Further-
more, the literature ﬁnds a tendency against structural with regards to housing and urban
development. Based on a referendum against part of the property investment projectMe-
diaspree in Berlin (Germany), Ahlfeldt (2011) shows that the resistance against further
construction is mostly driven by an expected loss of cultural amenities within cities.
Ahlfeldt (2012) examines the pattern for a referendum on a soccer stadium in Munich in
2011 and ﬁnds that voters (regardless of being home- or leasevoters) in proximity to the
project strongly voted against it, even though there was high support on the aggregated
level. Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2015) apply the homevoter hypothesis to a public referen-
dum on an airport concept for Berlin. They show that homevoters, unlike leasevoters,
2This statement applies in most cases but might be oﬀset in cases where a certain population
threshold enables the municipality to beneﬁt from the provision of public goods like schools,
kindergartens or public transport connections.
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tend to vote more strongly in favor of topics that positively aﬀect amenities surrounding
their house. Where the literature on homevoters uses referendums to identify a possible
homevoter eﬀect, my study is the ﬁrst to show that the homevoter might also aﬀect
policies during election times.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes German municipalities, local
elections and the underlying dataset. Section 3 describes my empirical strategy, shows
my main results and applies robustness tests. Section 4 shows how homevoters seems
to drive my main results and discusses alternative channels. Section 5 concludes my
research.
2 Institutional setting and data
2.1 German municipalities
Municipalities are the lowest administrative tier in Germany. They provide a large variety
of public goods (zoning, infrastructure, kindergartens and general public services) of
which some are mandatory and other voluntary. Furthermore, some of these public
goods are provided in cooperation with higher-tier administrative layers and others are
solely the responsibility of the municipality. Most importantly, municipalities have a
constitutional right to self-administration (Kommunale Selbstverwaltung, Art. 28 Abs. 2
GG).
This municipal self-administration is manifested by giving municipalities autonomy over
land-use-planning as well as local taxation (business tax and two kinds of property taxes).
Furthermore, municipalities have a high degree of autonomy for municipal land use plans,
which is only limited by state and federal construction law. Revenues from local taxes
account for 20% - 30% of the total municipal revenue. Hence, municipal funding is partly
predetermined but municipalities have discretion here via local fees and local taxes and
parameters on the spending side.
The permission for a construction project is in the hands of the building control authority
(Bauaufsichtsbehörde), which checks whether the project ﬁts the municipal zoning plans
and if existing construction laws are violated. Therefore, municipalities do not have
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discretion over the process of approval, although they have powerful tools (like zoning) to
lay the framework in which the building control authority may decide. This is important
since the building control authority is usually located in the county administration and
not in the municipality itself.3
In general, municipalities have four tools to shape local land use and the building struc-
ture. The Land use plan for the next 15 to 20 years (Flaechennutzungsplan, 5 Abs.
1 Satz 1 BauGB) and the municipal construction plan (Bebauungsplan, 8 Abs. 1
Satz 1 BauGB) act more as general plans / macro tools, a development freeze (Verän-
derungssperre, 14,15 BauGB) and the municipal accord (Gemeindliches Einvernehmen,
36 BauGB) act as micro tools for the urban shape. In the following, these tools will be
described in more detail.4
The most general tool is the land use plan which assigns the residential, commercial
and agricultural land use within municipalities. This plan is usually developed by the
local municipality and approved by a higher tier of administration, usually the county.
Nevertheless, this plan is merely a planning tool and not legally binding. The construction
plan on the other hand is legally binding. Where the land use plan has to be created
for the whole municipal area, the construction plan gives speciﬁcs about parceled areas
open for development. Here, municipalities have full discretion to develop these plans by
taking existing laws, like environmental issues, into account.
If municipalities strongly oppose certain construction projects even though they ﬁt into
the current municipal construction plan, municipalities have micro tools at hand. The
most common tool is the development freeze, which allows municipalities to freeze a
construction approval process in order to adjust the municipal construction plan. Usually
this freeze lasts for two years but can be extended on a yearly basis for up to four years.
It is also important to note that a construction freeze requires legal justiﬁcation, which
3Some big municipalities also have the building authority within their boundaries. This is,
however, more of an exception. Any eﬀects regarding the location of the building authority are
negligible, since this paper focuses on smaller municipalities. Furthermore, standard errors are
later clustered on a higher administrative level to take this eﬀect into account.
4Detailed construction laws diﬀer within West German federal states, although the legal tools
described above are the same in all states. The later analysis will take this diﬀerences into
account by using municipality ﬁxed eﬀects which include state ﬁxed eﬀects as well.
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means it can not be prohibitive without a reason.5
A further micro tool is the municipal accord. When the building control authority re-
ceives the building application, it informs the municipality about the project. Then the
municipality has two months to respond, otherwise the municipal accord is implicitly
assumed. A municipality is legally not allowed to refuse consent for other than legal rea-
sons. Furthermore, a municipality may give its consent with certain imposts, which might
delay construction projects as well if legal concerns are valid. Nevertheless, it seems that
in practice municipalities sometimes withhold consent for political reasons (Dirnberger,
2008), even though they might face legal consequences. Theoretically, the municipality
has the best chance to withhold municipal consent if the parceled area does not have a
municipal construction plan. Here, a municipality could argue that they need to adjust
the construction plan if the building under construction might not ﬁt into neighborhood.
In 20106, the federal court ruled that the building control authority was to be held
accountable if municipal accord was illegally denied by the municipality. Previously,
the accountability in case of an unlawfully declined construction project was not clearly
divided between the county administration and the municipality. Hence, neither the
building administration, nor the municipality were per se accountable and usually a court
had to decide. Since then, municipally accords have not been used with such laxness
because the county administration was controlling more strictly. This also justiﬁes the
use of the year 2010 as the upper bound of my panel, because it is likely that this eﬀect
diminishes.
So how may a municipality limit construction approvals in election times? Since the land
use plan is rather imprecise and not legally binding, it does not allow a micro inﬂuence
on certain projects. The municipal accord might be a potential angle but is also rather
costly due to the potential legal consequences if denied for illegal reasons. The most
promising tool might be the development freeze for speciﬁc development projects. Here,
municipalities may either delay the approval until the elections are completed or change
the municipal construction plan in such a way that inhabitants approve the process more
or the project becomes unfeasible. In practice, this might for example mean that a
5All factors that can be determined in the construction plan are listed in 9 BauGB. In total
there are 26 diﬀerent factors that need to be determined. Speciﬁcally interesting for this paper
are the amount of maximum apartments in one house, the amount of public housing, as well as
environmentally protected areas.
6Speciﬁcally, the federal court ruled on this under case number III ZR 29/10 from 16.09.2010
7
new construction project is not allowed to have as many ﬂats as initially planned or the
construction plan should include more green areas in order to make the project unfeasible
or at least be delayed.
2.2 Municipal elections
In Germany, municipal elections are usually held every ﬁve years, with the exception of
Bavaria, where elections take place every six years. A summary of all municipal elections
and their respective timings in the relevant period can be found in Figure 1. As one
can see, municipal elections are not held simultaneously across the federal states during
the period of my study. In 2014, the elections tend to cluster strongly, but this period
is excluded from my research. It is interesting to note that even if local elections take
place in the same year across diﬀerent federal states, the timing within the year still
diﬀers. This is indicated by diﬀerent lengths of the blue bars in Figure 1, where the
length represents the share of the year until the election takes place.7
Local elections serve the purpose of electing the municipal council. The discretion of
the mayor and the council varies slightly between the federal states but the municipality
itself is always in charge of the local land use process. As pointed out, the timing of
the local elections allows me to identify the variation of housing approval during election
times and disentangles the election eﬀect from common time eﬀects.
Figure 1: Municipal election dates and the intra-year timing in West Germany
7This intra-year timing will be taken into account by the econometric speciﬁcation later on.
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2.3 Data
The German Federal Statistics Oﬃce provides a rich data set on the municipal level,
which allows a disaggregated analysis over time. Speciﬁcally, yearly data from all munic-
ipalities from 2002 until 2014 is provided. This enables me to observe housing approval
policies over time and track their changes during election periods. All cross sections from
2008 onward were collected online8, while all cross sections before 2008 were obtained
from Statistik lokal CDs from the German Statistics Oﬃce. Furthermore, I enriched my
dataset with information from the German census in 20119.
Regarding housing data, I collected the approved and ﬁnished housing and non-housing
(Nutzﬂäche) area in square-meters (sqm). Using the approved sqm should provide suf-
ﬁcient variation to observe potential changes during election times. Furthermore, the
data allows a distinction regarding ﬁnished construction and building licenses. Here, I
gathered data on the absolute number of approved and ﬁnished houses and apartments.
Furthermore the data allows me to track the approvals, completion and stock of houses
with one, two or three and more apartments over time. My main dependent variable will
be the ratio of approved sqm of housing units per 1,000 inhabitants. This should allow
me to take diﬀerent size eﬀects of municipalities into account10.
As independent variables over time, I include the population and the population density
to take the total size and agglomeration diﬀerences into account. My data also allows
me to model the demographic structure of the municipality over time by using the share
of young (below 15 years) and old (above 65 years) inhabitants in the municipality. In
order to proxy income diﬀerences across municipalities, I include the municipal share of
federal income tax per capita. I collected the local tax rates and their respective tax
bases, which are, however, not included. Foremny and Riedel (2014) show that business
taxes are also manipulated during elections, which would feed into the error term and
hence cause endogeneity. The two local property taxes A and B are at the discretion
of local politicians, which leads me to the conclusion that these variables should also be
excluded11.
8www.regionalstatistik.de
9https://ergebnisse.zensus2011.de
10In further robustness checks, I will use diﬀerent normalizations to verify my results.
11Initial political budget cycle regressions for the rate of the property tax B shows some
adjustment during election times. This encourages me to omit the tax rates from the regressions.
The results are available from the author upon request.
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In addition, I gathered the share of homeowners from the national census in 2011 on
the municipality level. This data allows a test of the homevoter hypothesis, as outlined
above. Unfortunately, information about homeowners is only available for the year 2011,
which of course allows only a limited test and implicitly assumes that the relative spatial
distribution of homeowners among municipalities is constant over time. I do not think
that this assumption is too strict, since the homeowner rate should have a low within
variation and for this variable I am mainly interested in the between variation during
election times.
My dataset covers all West German municipalities from 2002 until 2014. Nevertheless,
I limit my panel to observations until the year 2010 since it is likely that the leeway for
municipalities to delay construction approvals decreased from 2011 on due to the ruling
of the federal court (see section 2.1). In addition, the municipal data was changed by
census corrections from 2011 onwards, which would introduce a structural break in my
dataset.
Municipalities that were subject to mergers were excluded to avoid confounding factors.
Furthermore, I excluded municipalities with less than 1,000 and more than 20,000 inhab-
itants. I set 20,00012 inhabitants as my upper boundary for the included municipalities,
since it is the oﬃcial threshold for small towns in Germany. Small municipalities with
less than 1,000 inhabitants were excluded as well due to a lack of variation in the housing
approvals, as I will explain the following paragraphs.
Using the area of housing approval as dependent variable provides suﬃcient variation to
identify my eﬀect of interest as one can see in Table 1. In the raw data, the housing sqm
are coded in units of 1000 sqm, where the last two digits are missing (i.e. 1.2 instead
of 1233). Therefore, this variable accumulates some measurement error which should be
more severe in small municipalities. Furthermore, observations with less than 100 sqm
were censored for reasons of data protection. Both types of censoring justify my approach
removing the smallest municipalities from my estimation sample. Losing the last digits
removes valuable variation, which matters most in small municipalities. Moreover, small
municipalities have, in absolute terms, a lower value of approved sqm and are therefore
more likely to be aﬀected by the bottom censoring. However, the measurement error that
remains within my observations due to the censoring is likely to be randomly distributed
12Even when increasing the upper threshold, the results remain similar. The results are avail-
able from the author upon request.
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and should only increase the conﬁdence intervals.
The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. Here, one can see that the depen-
dent variable Approved housing area in sqm per 1,000 inhabitants oﬀers a reasonable
variation to identify potential election eﬀects. The ﬁnished housing area sqm per 1,000
inhabitants oﬀers a similar variation and hence it is natural to use this variable in a
placebo test in the empirical section.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main dependent variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Approved housing area in sqm per 388 395 0 25,092 44,847
1,000 inhabitants
Finished housing area in sqm per 329 322 0 25,302 44,847
1,000 inhabitants
Population 5,025 4,286 1000 20,000 44,847
Share young(<15yrs.) 0.161 0.022 0.056 0.275 44,847
Share old(>65yrs.) 0.184 0.034 0.059 0.419 44,847
Population density 21.70 23.53 1.37 306 44,847
Share income tax per capita 295.52 84.15 0 779 44,847
Share of homeowners (0 - 100) 67.28 8.9 30.22 91.26 4,983
Source: Own calculations based on oﬃcial statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
When visualizing the dependent variable in Figure 2, one can see on the LHS in 2a, that
the sample has some severe outliers which occur, however, in small numbers. Hence, I cut
the distribution on the RHS to inspect the densest part of the data in more detail, which
is shown in Figure 2b. Two features are striking; ﬁrst, one can see that the dependent
variable accumulates a certain amount of zeros (around 2500 observations) and that the
distribution is otherwise smooth around the mean. This graphs shows the necessity
to cut the distribution at the upper and the lower tail in robustness checks later on.
Nevertheless, I keep these observations for my main analysis since this allows me to work
with a balanced panel.
In the next step, I visualize the time pattern of my dependent variable. First, I plot
the trajectories of the (mean) approved housing area by NUTS1 regions in Figure 3. It
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(a) Full distribution, bins = 200 (b) Outliers excluded, bins = 200
Figure 2: Density of the dependent variable
is apparent that all federal states follow a similar macro pattern of decreasing housing
approvals over time which is mainly driven by a decrease in governmental social housing
policies during the period. However, suﬃcient micro variation within the states can also
be observed.
Figure 3: Development of approved housing area over time by Nuts1 regions
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3 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
3.1 Empirical Model
My main empirical model looks as follows:
yi,t =
∑
eleci,tθ + βxi,t + µi + τt + i,t (1)
In (1), yi,t denotes the dependent variable, i.e. Approved housing area in sqm per 1,000
inhabitants. xi,t is a matrix of the covariates as described in section 2.3. µi and τt
indicate municipality and year eﬀects, respectively. i,t represents a well-behaved error
term. The coeﬃcient of interest is θ and deﬁned as follows:
elec =
Electiont−1Electiont
Electiont+1
 and = 1 in the pre− election year, 0 otherwise= days until election365 in the election year, 0 otherwise
= 1 in the post− election year, 0 otherwise
Since municipal election dates vary considerably between the federal states13 politicians
have diﬀerent time budgets to adjust housing policies in election years. A simple binary
dummy for the election year would blur this eﬀect, i.e. an eﬀect for an early election
might be overestimated, whereas the eﬀect for a late election could be underestimated.
Hence, the dummy is replaced with a weight between zero and unity, given how far the
election stretches into the year14. For example, if the election takes place on the 31st of
December in the given year, this weight will be unity. Otherwise it will be a fraction of
the days already passed in the given year. The precise weight of each speciﬁc election
year dummy can be inferred from Figure 1.
This setup of the election dummies allows me to disentangle the election year eﬀects from
the post and pre election year eﬀects. Since election dates vary considerably between the
13During the investigated period, the earliest election took place after 60 days had passed,
whereas the latest election took place after 269 days had passed in the year
14In further robustness tests, I will also compare the performance of this speciﬁcation with
more traditional ones.
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federal states, my approach resembles a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence setting, where I compare
municipalities that are subject to local elections to municipalities that do not experience
an election in the given year. Furthermore, the timing of the municipal elections should
allow me to disentangle the election eﬀect from the common negative time trend.
Using (1), I will try to answer two hypotheses. First, I will verify whether the business
cycle indeed exists for housing approval. This should be indicated by a negative coeﬃ-
cient of θ in the election year and a positive coeﬃcient of θ in the year after the election.
Second, I will examine whether homeowners in the respective municipality might drive
these results. This hypothesis will be investigated in section 4. Speciﬁcally, I will dis-
tinguish between diﬀerent types of houses (single/double family houses and houses with
three and more apartments) and also interact the election year dummies with the share of
homeowners in 2011 using the census data. If the adjustment is caused by homeowners,
I would expect that the results are more pronounced for single and double family houses
and that municipalities with a higher share of homeowners drive these results. Single
and double family houses should be most aﬀected by the presence of homevoters because
similar buildings tend to cluster together within municipalities. Since homevoters op-
pose development policies in their direct environment, I would expect that the negative
election eﬀect should vanish if the number of apartments per house is increased (which
of course increases strongly the likelihood that the inhabitants are not homeowners any
more) because these projects are not conducted regularly in the same area of single and
double family houses. One might still assume that homevoters should also oppose apart-
ment buildings to the supply side eﬀect on the housing market. But it is less likely that
apartments and single / double family houses satisfy the same demand structure on the
real estate market due to potentially diﬀerent qualities of the estate.
Due to the fact that the tools to postpone construction plans need a majority in the
municipal council I do not expect that all municipalities show this pattern during election
times. I suspect that the eﬀects, which are evaluated at the mean, will be of rather small
magnitude since a suitable housing project needs to be present in the election year to
conduct this kind of policy.
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3.2 Main results
The main results can be reviewed in Table 2, where all estimated model resemble (1).
Columns (1) - (5) use the approved housing sqm per 1,000 inhabitants as dependent
variable, where (5) is my preferred estimation. Starting with a pooled OLS in Column
(1), I subsequently add municipality eﬀects in (2), year eﬀects in (3), a combination of
both eﬀects in (4) and control variables in (5). For the remainder of this paper, (5) will
serve as my benchmark. Starting with pooled OLS in (1), one can see descriptively that
a reduction in approved housing area had already occurred one year before the elections,
which remains similar when adding municipality FE in (2). However, when controlling
for year ﬁxed eﬀects in (3), one can see that the pattern shifts to a reduction in the
election year and a catch up in the post election year. Furthermore, when combining
both kinds of ﬁxed eﬀects, this decrease and catch-up process becomes more clear in (4).
The covariates add some explanatory power to the model in (5) but do not change the
main result, which is a ﬁrst indication of the main result's robustness.
Regarding the economic signiﬁcance of Electiont in (5), the coeﬃcient explains around
11.4 percent of the mean of approved housing area. For an average sized small town of
5,000 inhabitants, this translates to a decrease of around 200 sqm housing area during
election times. This seems intuitive since the coeﬃcient measures an evaluation at the
mean. I suspect that not all municipalities use this tool during election times; it is merely
a tool used when an application for a building permit is present.
In the next step, I plot the adjustment of housing approvals during election times. The
results can be reviewed in Figure 4. Figure 4a on the LHS shows descriptive values where
the time period is centered for the election year at t = 0. In Figure 4b on the RHS, I
plot the regression results based on Table A.1 in Appendix A. Here, I regressed only one
election coeﬃcient at one point in time but with a longer time horizon regarding the
election. By comparing both Figures, one can see the adjustment during election times.
Furthermore, by controlling for common time eﬀects, the overall negative trend on the
LHS is removed on the RHS. Furthermore the results show that the catch-up process
from delayed housing approvals persists up to two years after the election.
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Table 2: Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Electiont−1 -49.191*** -41.465*** -17.797*** -6.508 -5.614
(5.609) (4.892) (5.513) (4.941) (4.977)
Electiont -63.575*** -66.952*** -42.070*** -44.405*** -44.358***
(10.594) (8.502) (11.194) (8.931) (8.909)
Electiont+1 7.376 8.886** 19.314*** 22.367*** 24.794***
(5.094) (3.694) (5.184) (4.187) (4.137)
Municipality FE No Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.088 0.125 0.137
N 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847
Notes: Dependent variable: Approved housing sqm per 1,000 inhabitants. Robust
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own
calculations.
(a) Raw trend without time eﬀect (b) Controlling for time eﬀect
Figure 4: Housing approval pattern around election t = 0
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3.3 Robustness
In the following subsection, I will conduct a series of checks to verify the robustness of
my results. First, I will apply a series of placebo tests to examine whether my observed
variation is caused by actions of municipalities during election times or merely a statistical
artifact. This exercise is conducted in Table 3. Column (1) displays my main results
as a benchmark. In (2), I replace the municipal election dummy with the state federal
election dummy and (3) uses the ﬁnished, instead of the approved, housing area.
Regarding the state elections, I can not control for the year prior to and following the
election since during my observation period some federal elections took place in two
consecutive years in the same federal state. (2) veriﬁes that there is no political ad-
justment of housing policies during state elections. (3) shows that the adjustment of
housing approval during election times is not caused by random correlation. This is done
by investigating the pattern of ﬁnished housing area during election periods. Finished
housing area should not be at the discretion of local politicians because once the approval
is given, the local landlord will follow his own agenda and schedule for the construction
project15. Since the election coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant and of small magnitude in (3),
I conclude that there is no willing adjustment of ﬁnished housing area but some alter-
ations to the approved housing area. This is especially interesting, since approved and
ﬁnished housing area have similar distributions as shown by the estimated density for
both variables in Figure B.1 in Appendix B. These results verify that housing approvals
are willingly adjusted during election times, where other elections from diﬀerent tiers
or ﬁnished housing area, which is not at the discretion of politicians, do not show any
eﬀect.16
In Table 4, I exclude single federal states to verify the stability of my results. One can
see that magnitude and signiﬁcance vary slightly but the sign of the coeﬃcient remains
unchanged. My results remain similar and therefore I conclude to observe a general
phenomenon.
15Nevertheless, local politicians might still inﬂuence the ﬁnished housing area during election
via timed housing approvals in the years before the election. Since each housing project follows a
unique schedule, it is rather unlikely that housing approvals could be timed with such foresight.
16I also conducted regressions for ﬁnished non-housing area. Here, the conﬁdence intervals of
Electiont−1,Electiont and Electiont+1 overlap strongly which indicates that there is no change
of pattern during election times. I did not show the results since this regression has a very low
R2 of 0.023, where the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient might actually be misleading. The result is available
from the author upon request.
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Table 3: Placebo tests
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Approved housing Approved housing Finished housing
per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh.
Used elections Municipal State Municipal
Electiont−1 -5.614 -6.343
(4.977) (4.321)
Electiont -44.358*** 4.919 5.408
(8.909) (4.027) (9.747)
Electiont+1 24.794*** 3.232
(4.137) (3.450)
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.136 0.049
N 44,847 44,847 44,847
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Source: Own calculations.
Table 4: Exclude single federal states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Excluded state SH NDS NRW Hessia RPF BW Bay SL
Electiont−1 -5.591 -5.204 -4.187 -12.294** -9.010* 2.321 -3.312 -5.279
(5.438) (5.842) (5.102) (5.493) (4.688) (5.873) (5.613) (5.002)
Electiont -50.666*** -43.272*** -40.702*** -48.893*** -37.420*** -53.734*** -36.590*** -43.624***
(9.198) (12.722) (9.764) (9.366) (8.827) (10.296) (10.202) (8.957)
Electiont+1 27.817*** 24.640*** 27.145*** 20.670*** 29.465*** 18.399*** 21.715*** 25.326***
(4.270) (4.910) (4.281) (4.620) (3.698) (5.257) (5.426) (4.173)
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.120 0.135 0.137 0.167 0.138 0.130 0.137
N 41643 39078 43308 41580 38925 36576 28323 44496
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own calculations.
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Afterwards, I cluster my main results on a higher administrative level in Table A.2 in
Appendix A. Speciﬁcally, I follow the Classiﬁcation for Territorial Units for Statistics
NUTS (French: Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques). Here, I cluster on
the NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 level.17 In addition, I also cluster my standard errors
on the NUTS2-year and the NUTS1-year level. The results remain signiﬁcant through-
out diﬀerent kinds of clustering. Nevertheless the results for the NUTS1-year two-way
clustering are only signiﬁcant on the 3.9% level, which might lead to the conclusion that
a part of the variation could be driven by federal state speciﬁc policies in certain years.
To examine this further, I repeated my baseline regression with linear and squared NUTS1
speciﬁc trends to see whether the results change. The results are shown in Table A.3
in Appendix A. In (1) and (2) I included the NUTS1 speciﬁc trends in a linear and
quadratic dimension. In (3) and (4) I veriﬁed as well whether outliers drive my results
and repeated the benchmark regression by omitting all observations with a higher value
than 95% quantile in (3) and lower than the 5% quantile (i.e. I removed all zero entries)
in (4). Throughout all tests, my results remain signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude.
Therefore I conclude that my results are not driven by federal state-speciﬁc policies nor
outliers in my dependent variable. This increases the conﬁdence in my results and I
conclude that my observed pattern is not driven by some speciﬁc eﬀects from a higher
degree of administration like the counties or the federal state.
In a last series of robustness tests, I verify the stability of my results with regard to
assumptions about the normalization of my dependent variable, the measurement of the
election eﬀect and the population threshold to include municipalities in the sample. First,
I verify in Table A.4 in Appendix A whether diﬀerent normalizations of the approved
housing area show diﬀerent patterns. (1) shows the baseline results for comparison, (2)
simply shows the level of approved housing area in sqm without normalization, (3) is
the log version of my baseline speciﬁcation, (4) normalizes with the stock of housing
area from the land use plan in 200418. Throughout (2) to (4) the sign of the coeﬃcients
and the signiﬁcances remain the same. Second, I change the speciﬁcation of θ in Table
17NUTS units usually follow existing local administrative structures and consist of three lev-
els. Usually the level of NUTS is assigned via population thresholds: NUTS1 corresponds in
Germany to the Länder, NUTS2 to administrative districts (which do not have any governmen-
tal responsibilities in the German context) and NUTS3, which corresponds to German counties
where the building authority is located.
18Land use data is only available in 4 year intervals before 2008 and on a yearly basis from
2009 on.
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A.5 in Appendix A. In (1) I use my benchmark regression and add also a state election
dummy. In (2), I combine Electiont−1 and Electiont into one coeﬃcient and weight the
indicator by the month in which the local election takes place. In (3) θ is weighted by
the months that passed into the election year and (4) uses a traditional binary variable
whether the given year is an election year or not. Throughout all speciﬁcations, my main
results remain unchanged. Third and last in Table A.6 in Appendix A I vary the lower
bound of the population threshold to include or exclude municipalities into the sample.
When using any arbitrary population threshold for the lower bound, my main results
remain unchanged. When I also include the smallest municipalities, i.e. municipalities
with fewer than 500 inhabitants, the eﬀect vanishes and the R-squared drops as well.
This reﬂects the concerns regarding the bottom censoring I expressed in section 2.3.
4 Mechanism
So far, this paper has shown an adjustment of approved housing construction during
election times in small to medium sized West German municipalities. This eﬀect remains
the same throughout diﬀerent robustness tests. In this section, I will shed some light on
the underlying mechanism behind this adjustment. I consider two explanations, which
might be either an adjustment of politicians towards the homevoter or a general reduction
in government activity during election times. An indirect test of political adjustment
during election times would be to verify whether the adjustment could be explained by
the presence of homeowners. If the results show a signiﬁcant eﬀect, I would interpret this
as the ﬁrst suggestive evidence in favor of the homevoter hypothesis. This would allow
me to rule out reduced political activity during elections as an alternative explanation.
In order to test for my hypothesis, I conduct two empirical exercises. First, I verify
whether the adjustment of approved housing licenses is driven by single family houses,
which is more likely a concern of homevoters. Second, I use data from the census in 2011
and check whether the share of homeowners explains the adjustment during election
times.
The ﬁrst exercise is conducted in Table 5. (1) replaces the approved sqm with total sum
of approved houses per 1,000 inhabitants. (2) uses the approved apartments instead of
the houses, (3), (4) and (5) use only houses with one, two or three and more apartments
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per house, respectively. First, one can see that the approved eﬀect still persists in (1)
and (2). Second, the eﬀect is the most signiﬁcant in economic and statistical terms in
(3) and (4) for private residential buildings with only one or two apartment, which are
most likely being constructed or owned by homeowners. It is interesting to note that the
eﬀect diminishes when housing categories with more than two apartments per house are
considered in (5). This is ﬁrst suggestive evidence for the homevoter hypothesis, since
single / double family houses and multi-family houses usually tend to cluster together
and homevoters care about their direct environment.
Table 5: Housing construction categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Approved house Approved House appr. House appr. House appr.
licences apartments with 1 app. with 2 app. with 3+ app.
per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh.
Electiont−1 -0.040 -0.050 -0.041 0.002 -0.011
(0.035) (0.042) (0.034) (0.010) (0.019)
Electiont -0.275*** -0.329*** -0.229*** -0.098*** -0.002
(0.055) (0.075) (0.052) (0.024) (0.045)
Electiont+1 0.154*** 0.189*** 0.122*** 0.052*** 0.015
(0.030) (0.037) (0.028) (0.010) (0.018)
Mean eﬀect t 11.7% 11% 11.5% 17% 0.04%
Mean eﬀectt+ 1 6.6% 6.3% 6.1% 9.5% 3.2%
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.122 0.091 0.100 0.008
N 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own
calculations.
To examine this theory further, I verify whether the eﬀect is more pronounced in mu-
nicipalities with a higher share of homeowners. Therefore, I will interact the election
year dummy with the share of homeowners in 2011 in the respective municipality. The
modiﬁed version of(1) looks as follows:
yi,t =
∑
eleci,tθ + (eleci,t × vi,t) η + βxi,t + µi + τt + i,t (2)
In (2), all parameters are deﬁned as before, where vi,t is a dummy variable that deﬁnes in
which quantile the share of the homeowners from the respective municipality is. Here, I
split vi,t at diﬀerent quantiles (25%,50%,75%,90%). η denotes the estimation coeﬃcient.
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The results are shown in Table 6. In (1) vi,t indicates whether the respective munici-
pality is in the ﬁrst quartile of the homeowner shares, in (2) vi,t indicates whether the
homeowner share is above the median, in (3) vi,t represents whether a municipality has
a homeowner share in the fourth quartile and in (4) vi,t represents whether a municipal-
ity is above the 90% quantile. In (5) and (6) I only use municipalities with a share of
homeowners in the ﬁrst or fourth quartile.
The coeﬃcients show the expected sign according to the homevoter hypothesis. Where
lowest share of homeowners almost negates the election year eﬀect Electiont, the eﬀect
becomes negative and increases in magnitude when the homeowner share is relatively
high, i.e. in the 90% quantile. The eﬀect for the 25% and 90% also shows statistic
signiﬁcance on the 10% value but the eﬀect of the homevoter becomes more signiﬁcant
when comparing only municipalities with the highest and lowest share of homeowners
in (6). Furthermore, the mean eﬀect more than doubles when using only municipalities
with a high homevoter share. I interpret these results to mean that my observed negative
election year eﬀect is driven by the homeowners share. Combined with the fact that the
negative variation stems from single and double family houses, I regard my ﬁndings as
suggestive evidence for the homevoter hypothesis.
Table 6: Interactions with share of homeowners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dataset Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Only 1st and Only 1st and
4th Quartile 4th Quartile
Electiont−1 -5.557 -5.602 -5.637 -5.656 -2.494 -2.560
( (4.973) (4.976) (4.977) (4.973) (8.478) (8.478)
Electiont -52.341*** -35.538*** -38.492*** -39.366*** -12.250 -21.405
(10.284) (10.730) (9.591) (8.984) (16.253) (13.676)
Electiont+1 24.858*** 24.829*** 24.797*** 24.794*** 31.173*** 31.132***
(4.141) (4.143) (4.137) (4.136) (6.818) (6.789)
Homeowner Quantiles
interacted with Elect
25% < 33.337*
(17.250)
> 50% -18.473
(16.389)
> 75% -27.593 -46.842*
(25.026) (28.372)
> 90 % -66.620* -77.935**
(36.935) (38.869)
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.107 0.107
N 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847 22,419 22,419
Notes : Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own calculations.
My approach provides a straightforward setup to test for the homevoter hypothesis during
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election cycles. Nevertheless, having only one cross section of homeowner shares provides
rather little variation, as can be seen in Table 1. A clear direct test of this hypothesis
would be to verify whether the amount of development freezes or declined municipal
accords for housing construction approval decreases during election times and whether
a causal eﬀect of the lower approval rate is linked to the share of homeowners. In
terms of a natural experiment it would be useful to randomly assign diﬀerent shares of
homevoters to a municipality and observe whether this causes an increase in measures
in municipal councils to postpone construction approvals. However, exhaustive data
regarding declined municipal accords and development freezes is not available19 and the
spatial variation of homeowners is rather consistent over time and not available as a time
series. Therefore, my results will provide suggestive evidence for the homevoter eﬀect
and show that the presence of homeowners actually accompanies political business cycles
for housing policies during election times.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the adjustment of housing policies during municipal election
years in West German municipalities. Using a sample of 4,983 West German municipal-
ities from 2002 to 2010, this paper shows that housing construction is reduced during
election times and increased afterwards. The results remain unchanged economically and
statistically after a variety of robustness tests.
Furthermore, this paper provides suggestive evidence that the magnitude of the eﬀect is
driven by the share of homeowners and single and double apartment houses, which are
more likely in the hand of homeowners. Homevoters, i.e. citizens who own their house
instead of leasing it, have the strongest incentive to oppose development policies in their
neighborhood since they have an incentive to maintain the value of their main house.
My paper contributes to the existing literature regarding the impact of the homevoter
by showing the inﬂuence not only through local referendums but during election times as
well. This adds an important new policy parameter to the literature on political business
cycles, which is so far mostly concerned with governmental spending and budgeting.
19Gathering the data manually would require the screening of all municipal council protocols
from all 4,983 municipalities over nine years.
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The aforementioned mechanism is important because this eﬀect might delay the natural
urbanization /suburbanization processes, which might put even more pressure on the re-
cent rent increase in agglomerations and the surrounding areas. Hence, the results imply
the importance of clear responsibilities in housing policies. As this paper clearly shows,
a non-transparent division of liability between diﬀerent layers of governments for hous-
ing policies might lead to ineﬃcient low housing approvals during election times. This
mechanism is most eﬃciently dealt with by establishing clear responsibility structures,
e.g. through measures like the court ruling in Germany in 2010.
Future research should investigate whether the share of homeowners can explain the use
of legal tools by municipal councils to delay housing construction. It is important to
investigate whether this construction approval delay manifests itself in higher housing
prices and, if this eﬀect exists, the spatial extent. Another fruitful topic for future
research is to dig deeper into a causal eﬀect of homeowners on construction approvals.
Is the electoral eﬀect actually caused by the homeowner or an unobserved factor that is
strongly correlated with the share of homeowners?
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A Appendix - Tables
Table A.1: Diﬀerent election timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year t = −2 t = −1 t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
Electiont -6.445 -12.426** -57.025*** 29.731*** 19.737*** -15.215*** -2.047
(4.012) (4.911) (8.645) (4.074) (4.069) (4.691) (4.880)
Notes : Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source:
Own calculations.
Table A.2: Standard error clustering of benchmark results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Clustering Municipality NUTS3 NUTS2-year NUTS2 NUTS1-year NUTS1
Electiont−1 -5.614
(p-value) ( 0.259) (0.344) (0.567) (0.413) (0.709) (0.525)
Electiont -44.358
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.039) (0.008)
Electiont+1 24.794
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.002) (0.146) (0.015)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes : P-values in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own
calculations.
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Table A.3: Remove outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nuts1 trend Nuts1 trend Remove Remove
linear squared top 5% zeros
Electiont−1 -0.886 1.790 -5.769** -5.908
(5.084) (5.028) (2.487) (5.543)
Electiont -45.265*** -35.390*** -25.737*** -43.867***
(9.037) (9.255) (6.338) (9.199)
Electiont+1 20.429*** 21.925*** 16.530*** 24.444***
(4.321) (4.403) (2.461) (4.252)
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.145 0.207 0.130
N 44,847 44,847 42,605 42,413
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Source: Own calculations.
Table A.4: Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Approved Approved log Approved Approved
housing sqm housing sqm housing sqm housing sqm
per 1,000 inh. per 1,000 inh. per stock sqm 2004
Electiont−1 -5.614 -0.022 0.018* 0.249
(4.977) (0.021) (0.011) (0.385)
Electiont -44.358*** -0.160*** -0.051** -2.666***
(8.909) (0.046) (0.025) (0.568)
Electiont+1 24.794*** 0.088*** 0.069*** 1.890***
(4.137) (0.017) (0.010) (0.344)
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.134 0.096 0.080
N 44,847 44,847 44,847 44,847
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.5: Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of election dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State elections Election month Election month Binary election
and pre-year dummy
Electiont−1 -4.798 -5.654 -7.067
(5.394) (4.977) (4.951)
Electiont -44.624*** -12.907* -44.011*** -17.608***
(8.822) (6.777) (8.819) (3.764)
Electiont+1 24.828*** 26.535*** 24.752*** 23.982***
(4.132) (4.106) (4.140) (4.249)
State Electiont 2.027
(4.339)
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
N 44847 44847 44847 44847
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.6: Results with diﬀerent population thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pop. threshold - >500 >1000 >1500 >2000 >2500 >3000 >5000
Electiont−1 0.850 -3.066 -5.614 -5.120 -3.657 -5.529 -5.740 -6.314
(5.091) (4.564) (4.977) (5.504) (6.163) (6.265) (6.833) (4.398)
Electiont -3.664 -30.912*** -44.358*** -39.791*** -36.852*** -33.910*** -28.550*** -29.403***
(15.921) (8.805) (8.909) (9.187) (9.406) (9.576) (9.610) (10.298)
Electiont+1 14.071*** 19.530*** 24.794*** 26.006*** 27.086*** 25.289*** 23.365*** 19.694***
(4.835) (3.857) (4.137) (3.648) (3.695) (3.695) (3.819) (4.377)
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.131 0.137 0.156 0.156 0.166 0.163 0.214
N 68938 56113 44847 36873 31275 26910 23841 15408
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: Own calculations.
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B Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: Comparison of densities of approved and ﬁnished housing sqm. Source:
Own calculations.
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